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NOTES
THE WHOLESALER'S LIABILITY TO THE CONSUMER
FOR INJURY DUE TO DEFECTIVE GOODS
The liability of sellers of goods to their immediate vendees, both
in tort and in contract, for injury resulting from defects in the goods,
is fairly clearly defined.' Likewise, the liability of manufacturers to
the ultimate consumer has been the subject of much legal thought.2,
Little attention has been focused, however, upon the tort and contract
liability of that other member of the merchandising chain, the whole-
saler, who is neither retailer nor manufacturer, but who serves as
a distributive link between the manufacturer and the retailer.3 Under
what conditions may these intermediate sellers of goods be held liable
to the ultimate consumer, whether in tort or in contract for breach
of warranty, for losses sustained as the result of a defect in the goods
distributed?
In this note the wholesaler is considered to be an independent
dealer' who purchases goods, handles them himself,' and sells them to
1. UNIFORm SALES ACT §§ 11-16; PROSsER, TORTS § 83 (2d ed. 1955) ; 4 SHEAR-
MAN & REDFILD, NEGLIGENCE §§ 653-58, 893 (rev. ed. 1941); 1 WILLISTON,
SALES §§ 178-257 (3d ed. 1948). The least settled aspect of sellers' 1.ability to
their immediate vendees seems to be where the goods, particularly food, are packed
in sealed containers by the manufacturer. In many jurisdictions it is held that a
vendor of such goods who has not himself packed them into the containers will
not be held liable to the consumer for injuries due to deleterious contents of the
container, since there is no opportunity for the seller to inspect the goods and
discover the defects. For a discussion of the "sealed container" doctrine as it
affects wholesalers, see note 76 infra.
2. See, e.g., Bohlen, Liability of Manufacturers to Persons Other Than Their
Immediate Vendees, 45 L.Q. REv. 343 (1929); Jeanblanc, Manufacturers' Liability
to Persons Other Than Their Immediate Vendees, 24 VA. L. REv. 134 (1937);
Notes, 22 WASH. U.L.Q. 406, 536 (1937) ; 25 WASH. U.L.Q. 293 (1940).
3. The scarcity of legal literature dealing with the liability of wholesalers and
other "middlemen" is doubtless due to the lack of any great number of cases
having arisen in the area. Unquestionably, many claims are settled without resort
to litigation; in addition, if a remedy exists against the retailer or the manu-
facturer, the injured consumer is far more likely to bring his action against one
of them without looking to the wholesaler, upon whom it is often difficult to im-
pose liability. It is only when retailer and manufacturer are insolvent, inaccessi-
ble or immune due to some judicial doctrine, or when the wholesaler is particu-
larly attractive as a defendant, due, for example, to a national reputation, that
an injured consumer will bring hisaction against the wholesaler.
4. As the scope of this note extends only to dealers in goods, the liability of
the casual seller to the sub-vendee will not be explored. In passing, however, it
should be noted that in regard to liability for breach of warranty the privity
requirement has been relaxed only where the courts have felt that public interest
requires it, and the relaxation has not extended to casual sellers. Therefore, any
action against a remote casual seller for breach of warranty must fail for lack
of contractual privity. In the tort area authority is scanty, but the unforesee-
ability of harm to a sub-vendee will be an obstacle to recovery in most negligence
actions. See 1953 WASH. U.L.Q. 443.
5. In addition to those wholesalers who handle the goods in which they deal,
there are others who deal in negotiable documents of title such as order bill
of lading and warehouse receipts, who do not handle the goods in which they deal.
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others for the purpose of further resale. The distinction between
such a wholesaler and a retailer, then, is an obvious one: while the
retailer sells goods directly to the consumer, there are no direct deal-
ings between the wholesaler and the consumer; in the language of
the courts, the two are not in contractual j"privity."6 The distinction
between wholesaler and manufacturer, however, is often not so easily
drawn. While, for example, the dealer who purchases canned goods in
cases and, without changing their condition, sells them to a retailer,
is clearly a wholesaler and not a manufacturer, some doubt arises as
to how to classify one who purchases a commodity in barrels and re-
sells it in bottles under a private label. Although the criteria are
neither precise nor exhaustive, on the whole it may be said that those
enterprises which process food and pack it in sealed containers, as-
semble component parts to form a finished product sold under the
trade name of the assembler, or employ processes which alter the form
or the nature of the goods handled, are generally considered manu-
facturers.7 Thus, a wholesaler may exercise such minor functions as
placing private labels upon goods or repackaging goods without be-
It is well established that one who merely takes a negotiable document of ttle
as security or with an attached draft for collection incurs no liability for implied
warranties of quality upon the goods represented by the document. See, e.g., Bank
of Italy v. Colla, 118 Ohio St. 459, 161 N.E. 330 (1928); Stacey-Vorwerk Co. v.
Buck, 42 Wyo. 136, 291 Pac. 809 (1930).
Where a middleman sells goods by negotiating a document of title, however,
he will be held to the same implied warranty liability as a wholesaler who handles
the goods himself. UNIFORM BILLS OF LADING ACT § 35; UNIFORM WAREHOUSE
RaciPTs ACT § 44; Federal Bills of Lading Act § 34, 39 STAT. 538 (1916), 49
U.S.C. § 114 (1952).
Where he has made an express warranty, the middleman-dealer in negotiable
documents of title may be more vulnerable to the consumer. Two recent federal
eases have held that express warranties made in deal'ng with such negotiable
documents are assignable by an immediate vendee to a sub-vendee. Hunter-Wilson
Distilling Co. v. Foust Distilling Co., 181 F.2d 543 (3d Cir. 1950); Esbeco Dis-
tilling orp. v. Owings Mills Distillery, Inc., 43 F, Supp. 380 (D. Md. 1942).
Since he has had no dealings with the goods themselves, it is unlikaly that a
middleman-dealer in negotiable documents of title will be held liable in negligence
to the ultimate consumer. But where a statute places an absolute duty upon him
in regard to the goods he may be held liable to the consumer. In Kearse v. Seyb,
200 Mo. App. 645, 209 S.W. 635 (1919), a fuel wholesaler who had merely handled
a bill of lading was held liable under statute to a consumer for failing to inspect
the carload of fuel he had sold.
6. For a discussion of privity of contract, see 4 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 773,
778 (1951).
7. Among those enterprises which the courts have held to be manufacturers
are: a dairy, which pasteurizes and bottles milk received from farmers, Carlson v.
Turner Centre System, 263 Mass. 339, 161 N.E. 245 (1928); one who bakes pie
crusts and fills them with a Prepared mixture purchased elsewhere, Sullivan v.
Manhattan Market Co., 251 Mass. 395, 146 N.E. 673 (1925); one who combines
ingredients to make sandwiches, Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., 14 Cal. 2d 272,
93 P.2d 799 (1939); a caterer, Bishop v. Weber, 139 Mass. 411, 1 N.E. 154 (1885);
an assembler of eomnonent parts to make a finished product, Martin v. Studebaker
Corp., 102 N.J.L. 612, 133 Atl. 384 (Ct. Err. & App. 1926) ; MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
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coming classified as a manufacturer.8 Where serious doubt exists as to
categorization, the courts seem to favor calling borderline enterprises
manufacturers; conceivably, this results in greater protection for the
purchasing public, since, as will be shown, the liability of the manu-
facturer is often more extensively recognized than that of the whole-
saler.9
Where an injured consumer is in a position to maintain an ad-
vantageous suit against the retailer or the manufacturer of the goods
which caused his injury, there is often little reason for his considering
an action against the wholesaler. However, if circumstances are such
as to make an action against the retailer or the manufacturer inadvis-
able, it may be that an action against the wholesaler is the injured
consumer's only feasible source of recovery. For example, the re-
tailer may be execution-proof, as with a corner grocer operating on
a hand-to-mouth basis,10 or the manufacturer may be a non-resident
of the state unwilling to submit to local jurisdiction." Under these
circumstances the wholesaler may remain the sole possible source of
recovery. In other situations, the particular position of the whole-
saler may make him a more attractive defendant than the retailer
or the manufacturer. Thus, the large wholesaler owning a famous
brand-name is a prime target for consumer claims, since his financial
condition is usually good, and he is particularly vulnerable in wishing
to avoid unflattering publicity.2
8. DICKERSON, PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND THE FOOD CONSUAIER § 2.26 (1951),
lists, without attempting to classify absolutely, a number of enterprises of differ-
ent kinds as representing the various shadings of degree between the food manu-
facturer and the food wholesaler. *
9. In Missouri, for example, an action for breach of implied warranty of quality
is allowed by the consumer against the manufacturer, Madouros v. Kansas City
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 230 Mo. App. 275, 90 S.W.2d 445 (1936), but a similar
action against the wholesaler will fail because privity is required. De Gouveia v.
H.D. Lee Mercantile Co., 231 Mo. App. 447, 100 S.W.2d 336 (1936).
10. But even the smallest and least affluent corner grocer is not necessarily
execution-proof; he may carry products liability insurance. See DICKERSON, Op.
cit. supra note 8, § 5.15.
11. The extreme seems to be presented in Burkhardt v. Armour & Co., 115 Conn.
249, 161 Atl. 385 (1932), where an Argentine manufacturer sold to an Argentine
distributor, who in turn sold to Armour for distribution in the United States.
Had the wholesaler not been held liable, the consumer would undoubtedly have
been left without recovery. See also H.J. Heinz Co. v. Duke, 196 Ark. 180, 116
S.W.2d 1039 (1938), as illustrative of the difficulties in obtaining jurisdiction
over nonresident manufacturers.
A somewhat novel situation was presented in the 1953 Kansas case of Nichols
v. Nold, 174 Kan. 613, 258 P.2d 317 (1953), in which the consumer joined retailer,
wholesaler, and manufacturer in a negligence action utilizing res ipsa loquitur.
See Note, 1954 WASH. U.L.Q. 215.
12. DICKERsoN, op. cit. supra note 8, § 5.17, says,
Where plaintiffs may recover directly against any seller to whom or through
whom defective goods can be traced, claims tend naturally to gravitate to
the closest available Big Name in the chain of manufacture and distribution,
whether he is the retailer, intermediate distributor, or manufacturer.
See also Note, 2 Mo. L. Rnv. 235, 238 (1937).
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Theories of Liability
The consumer who chooses to bring an action against the whole-
saler for injury resulting from a defect in the goods may proceed
either (1) in tort, where negligence is nearly always alleged, or (2)
in contract for breach of warranty, almost invariably for breach of
implied warranty of quality. Since in practice the measure of dam-
ages is substantially the same under both theories," the consumer-
plaintiff will proceed according to the available remedy which may
best be adapted to his case. If he is in a jurisdiction in which lack of
contractual privity is not a bar to a suit against the wholesaler for
breach of warranty,1' he will probably go forward on a theory of
warranty, since to recover he need only establish that the warranty
existed and that its breach caused his injury. Unquestionably, a
breach of warranty action is more attractive to an injured consumer
than is a negligence action. The drawback to the warranty action is
simply that to date, the great majority of states have refused to allow
a warranty action by the consumer against the wholesaler because of
lack of privity. In an action based upon a theory of negligence, on
the other hand, not only must the plaintiff establish that the whole-
saler in dealing with the goods owes him a duty of due care, but the
plaintiff must also prove that it was the wholesaler's failure to exer-
cise such due care which caused the injury. Proving this element of
fault-the failure to exercise due care-and establishing its causal
connection to the plaintiff's injury often causes great difficulty.15 In
summation, warranty liability is strict liability, imposed without the
need of an element of fault, while traditionally there must be an ele-
ment of fault in order to establish liability for negligence, although,
as will be shown, in many areas what is called "negligence" actually
amounts to strict liability.1'6
A. Liability in Tort
Virtually all tort actions by consumers against wholesalers for
losses due to defects in goods have involved allegations of negligence.
The few actions based upon other tort theories have been singularly
13. McCoRMICK, DAMAGES §§ 137, 176 (1935) ; DICKERSON, op. cit. supra note 8,
,4 5 2. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 917 (1939), provides that the measure of damages
in negligence cases is that the defendant is responsible for all damages foresee-
able at the time of the wrongful act; UNIFORM SALES ACT § 69 (6) provides "The
measure of damages for the breach of warranty is the loss directly and naturally
resulting in the ordinary course of events, from the breach of warranty." RE-
STATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§ 329, 330 (1932), is fundamentally the same.
14. See text supported by note 67 infra.
15 See, e.a., Mellace v John P. Squire Co.. 306 Mass. 515. 29 N E.2d 26(1940); Kusick v. Thorndike & Hix, Inc., 224 Mass. 413, 112 N.E. 1025 (1916).
16. See text supported by notes 39-44 infra.
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unsuccessful, primarily because of the- added difficulty of proof en-
countered with the more complex intentional torts such as deceit. 7
The early history of the negligence liability of persons who supply
goods to consumers is well known. Little more than a century ago
it was held that only where there was privity of contract between
supplier and consumer was there a duty of due care raised on the part
of the supplier in favor of the consumer in regard to the treatment
of the goods.18 Since there was no privity of contract between the
wholesaler or manufacturer and the consumer, it was held that these
suppliers of goods owed no duty of due care to the consumer. Ex-
ceptions to this harsh rule were coined early, the chief being that the
supplier of an "inherently dangerous" instrumentality, such as drugs
or volatile liquid fuels, could not take advantage of lack of privity to
escape liability to the consumer for negligence in handling the goods."
With the passage of time, the exceptions grew, and at last became
almost coextensive with the rule itself.20 At present, it is safe to say
that lack of contractual privity is no longer a bar to an action for
negligence against either the wholesaler or the manufacturer for
injury caused by a defect in the goods. 21
Liability to the consumer for negligence in supplying deleterious
goods may be imposed upon the wholesaler either: (1) for the whole-
saler's negligence, whether it be his own actual negligence, or the
"negligence" created by his failure to fulfill an absolute standard set
by statute; or (2) for the negligence of the manufacturer, where, by
17. For example, in fraud actions the burden of proving wilful intent has
proved insurmountable. Dobbin v. Pacific Coast Coal Co., 25 Wash. 2d 190, 170
P.2d 642 (1946), was an unsuccessful action for fraud against a wholesaler for
statements made in a circular showing how a furnace should function. Chanin
v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 89 F.2d 889 (7th Cir. 1937), involved the same kind of an
action, also unsuccessful, against an advertising manufacturer. See Note, 7
WASH. L. REv. 351 (1932).
18. The leading case is Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng.
Rep. 402 (1842). American cases generally followed its holding. See. e.q., Lebour-
dais v. Vitrified Wheel Co., 194 Mass. 341, 80 N.E. 482 (1907); Burkett v. Stude-
baker Bros. Mfg. Co., 126 Tenn. 467, 150 S.W. 421 (1912).
19. Davidson v. Nichols, 63 Mass. (11 Allen) 514 (1866) (drugs); Thomas v.
Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397 (1852) (drugs); Elkins, Bly & Co. v. McKean, 79 Pa.
493 (1875) (liquid fuel).
20. The real turning-point came in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y.
382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916), where the privity requirement was dropped almost
completely by a holding to the effect that lack of privity was not'a bar not only
where the instrumentality involved was inherently dangerous, but also if the
goods themselves were dangerous if defectively made. Since a reasonable user
will seldom be hurt by defective goods which are not rendered dangerous by reason
of their defect-the very fact that the consumer was injured is evidence of that
danger-the MacPherson case opened the door to negligence actions against the
manufacturers of virtually all types of goods.
21. PROSSER, TORTS 500 (2d ed. 1955); 4 SHEARMAN & REDFIELD, NEGLIGENCE§§ 653-55 (rev. ed. 1941).
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representing goods to be his own product, the wholesaler assumes the
manufacturer's negligence.22
1. Wholesaler's Liability for His Own Negligence
When an injured consumer brings what is truly a negligence action
against the wholesaler, that is, one in which there is no statutory
standard of care involved, or, if such a standard is involved, its viola-
tion is only evidence of negligence and not conclusive as to liability,
the standard of care required of the wholesaler is that which the rea-
sonable man would have exercised under similar circumstances. Thus,
the jury is called upon to ascertain both what the standard of care
should have been under the circumstances, and whether the wholesaler
in fact maintained that standard.
From a survey of the cases, it is seen that the wholesaler may be
held liable to the consumer for failure to use due care in discharging
the following duties: (1) the duty to purchase goods from reputable
manufacturers; (2) the duty to do no act which renders the goods
potentially harmful; (3) the duty to inspect the goods for defects; (4)
the duty to warn of a deleterious condition in the goods of which the
wholesaler has knowledge.
(1) The wholesaler's duty to purchase his goods from a reputable
manufacturer has not been defined with any degree of exactitude by
the courts. Originally, it was held that if this duty were satisfied,
there was no corresponding duty to make a reasonable inspection of
the goods; more recently, there is indication that the wholesaler must
satisfy both duties. Thus, in early cases, particularly those brought
against manufacturers, the purchase of component parts from repu-
table sources when shown by the defendants allowed them to escape
liability for failure to inspect such parts which had proved faulty
and injured consumers. 2- For example, where a motor-car manu-
facturer purchased completed spoke wheels from another manu-
facturer, and a consumer brought action against the motor-car manu-
facturer for injury caused by the collapse of one of those spoke wheels
due to a defect which reasonable inspection would have revealed, the
motor-car manufacturer successfully excused such lack of inspection
22. The distinction between the two categories is not always clear, since, where
a statute imposes strict liability upon the wholesaler for merely handling dele-
terious goods, it may be that the wholesaler is in fact being held liable for the
fault of the manufacturer. In that case, however, it is the wholesaler's disobedi-
ence of the absolute command of the statute which imposes a primary liability
on the wholesaler, rather than the negligence of the manufacturer imposing a
vicarious liability.
23. Martin v. Studebaker Corp., 102 N.J.L. 612, 133 Atl. 384 (Ct. Err. & App.
1926) (defective automobile wheel); Taylor v. Berner, 7 N.J. Misc. 597, 146
At. 674 (Sup. Ct. 1929) (defective bottle); Favo v. Remington Arms Co., 67
App. Div. 414, 73 N.Y. Supp. 788 (3d Dep't 1901) (defective gun barrel).
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by showing that he purchased the wheels from a reputable source.24
Such showing was made simply by establishing that other motor-car
manufacturers purchased their wheels from the same wheel-maker. 21
The decline of the use of the duty to purchase from a reputable source
as an alternative to the duty to inspect goods for defects was signaled
in MacPherson v, Buick Motor Co.,2' where Judge Cardozo rejected the
reputable source test as an alternative to the duty to inspect, asserting
that the assembler of component parts was responsible for the entire
finished product. Cardozo's view was later to be adopted through the
wide-spread acceptance of Section 400 of the Restatement of Torts,2T
which makes one who represents himself to be the manufacturer of
goods assume the same liability as though he were, in fact, the manu-
facturer. More recently, insofar as wholesalers are concerned, at least
one court has imposed the duty to purchase from a reputable manu-
facturer in addition to the duty to inspect the goods. 2"
(2) Cases involving the duty of the wholesaler to exercise reason-
able care to do no act which renders the goods potentially harmful to
the consumer usually arise only where the wholesaler, through such
functions as repackaging, has an opportunity to confuse or contami-
nate the goods with which he deals. If the wholesaler occupies a
purely distributive link in the merchandising chain, handling pre-
packaged goods, there may be few acts he can do which affect the
goods adversely. For this reason, most cases in this category have in-
volved wholesale fuel dealers or wholesale druggists. Thus, where a
ivholesale fuel dealer erroneously combines gasoline with kerosene,
producing a fuel of whose high volatility the consumer is unaware, it
is clearly the negligent act of the wholesaler which causes the con-
sumer's injury or death through a flash fire or explosion resulting
from attempted use of the fuel for heating purposes."9 Likewise,
24. Martin v. Studebaker Corp., 102 N.J.L. 612, 133 At]. 384 (Ct. Err. & App.
1926).
25. Ibid.
26. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). In the course of the opinion, Judge
Cardozo said:
We think the defendant was not absolved from a duty of inspection be-
cause it bought the wheels from a reputable manufacturer. It was not merely
a dealer in automobiles. It was a manufacturer of automobiles. It was re-
sponsible for the finished product. It was not at liberty to put the finished
product on the market without subjecting the component parts to ordinary
and simple tests.
217 N.Y. at 394, 111 N.E. at 1055.
27. See text supported by notes 47-55 infra. Although the New Jersey cases
cited in note 23 supra were decided after MacPherson, they came before the
,adoption of the Restatement position in Slavin v. Francis H. Leggett & Co.,
114 N.J.L. 421, 177 Atl. 120 (Sup. Ct. 1935), aff'd, 117 N.J.L. 101, 186 At. 832
(Ct. Err. & App. 1936), which overruled the earlier New Jersey cases in that it
made the assembler of component parts vicariously liable for the negligence of
any manufacturer of those parts.
*28. Fleetwood v. Swift & Co., 27 Ga. App. 502, 108 S.E. 909 (1921).
29. Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Deselms, 212 U.S. 159 (1909); Kentucky Inde-
pendent Oil Co. v. Schnitzler, 208 Ky. 507, 271 S.W. 570 (1925) ; Frazier v. Ayres,
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where a wholesale druggist labels linseed oil as cod-liver oil, liability
is properly imposed when the consumer, an unsuspecting farmer,.
mixes what he believes to be a nutritious vitamin with his chicken
feed, with the resultant death of half his flock.30
(3) A third duty the wholesaler owes the consumer is that of in-
specting the goods for defects. Of course, it is to be realized that with
a great number of modern products more than a cursory examination
is impossible. Because the wholesaler of canned goods, for example,
cannot thoroughly ascertain the condition of the contents of the cans
without destroying the salability of the goods, he will be required only
to make a reasonable inspection that is consistent with the nature of
the goods. 31 Where the goods are open to inspection, however, a thor-
ough inspection must be made.32 Thus, where a wholesaler could have
discovered a defect in a gasoline stove by reasonable inspection, he was
held liable to a consumer injured when the stove exploded. 33
(4) Closely related to the duty to inspect for defects is the duty to
warn the consumer of a deleterious condition in the goods of which
the wholesaler has knowledge. In other words, when, by inspection or
otherwise, the wholesaler learns of a defect in the goods, and he never-
theless determines to go ahead and sell the goods, he must warn the
consumer of the dangers involved. 34 Oftentimes, of course, the whole-
saler, upon learning of the deleterious condition, will not attempt to
sell the goods. With many products the market for avowedly defective
goods is nonexistent. Where, for example, spoiled food is involved,
the warned consumer is no consumer at all. But for various reasons,
20 So. 2d 754 (La. App. 1945); Wellington v. Downer Kerosene Oil Co., 104 Mass.
64 (1870); Stowell v. Standard Oil Co., 139 Mich. 18, 102 N.W. 227 (1905);
Kearse v. Seyb, 200 Mo. App. 645, 209 S.W. 635 (1919); Elkins, Bly & Co. v.
McKean 79 Pa. 493 (1875).
30. Eilis v. Lindmark, 177 Minn. 390, 225 N.W. 395 (1929). Other cases.
involving the liability of wholesale druggists for mislabeling include: Davidson v.
Nichols, 63 Mass. (11 Allen) 514 (1866); Darks v. Scudders-Gale Grocer Co., 146
Mo. App. 246 130 S.W. 430 (1910).
31. That the nature of the goods makes inspection for defects difficult or even
impossible, however, does not bring these negligence cases within the "sealed
container" doctrine, which only applies to breach of implied warranty of quality.
See note 76 infra.
32. King Hardware Co. v. Ennis, 39 Ga. App. 355, 147 S.E. 119 (1929). In
Howson v. Foster Beef Co., 87 N.H. 200, 177 Atl. 656 (1935), evidence of federal
inspection of pork, pursuant to statute, was held not to be conclusive in relieving
the defendant wholesaler from liability, but merely evidence in the defendant's
favor. Cf. Catani v. Swift & Co., 251 Pa. 52, 95 Atl. 931 (1915), where the trial
eourt gave judgment notwithstanding the verdict to the defendant meat packer
am the basis that evidence of government inspection was conclusive in the de-
fendant's favor; the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed, holding that federal
inspection alone was not enough-the defendant's duty was absolute.
33. King Hardware Co. v. Ennis, 39 Ga. App. 355, 147 S.E. 119 (1929).
34. See Ahrens v. Moore, 206 Ark. 1035, 178 S.W.2d 256 (1944), where the
wholesaler of a new anti-freeze had reason to suspect its deleterious nature, but
did not warn either retailers or consumers; Gerkin v. Brown & Sehler Co., 177
Mich. 45, 143 N.W. 48 (1913), where the wholesaler of dyed fur coats knew that
the dye had an adverse effect upon about one percent of the wearers, but gave no
warning.
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and with certain products, the wholesaler may choose to go ahead and
sell the defective goods. If he does so, he must accompany the goods
with a warning. In order for the warning to be of effect, it must
reach the consumer. The fact that the wholesaler has warned the re-
tailer would seem to be no legal defense to an action by a consumer
whom the retailer failed to warn.35 Although only a small percentage
of consumers may be adversely affected by the defect, a warning is
nonetheless necessary. Thus, where a dye used in fur coats was known
by the wholesaler to have ill effects upon one percent of the wearers, it
was incumbent upon the wholesaler to give a warning to prospective
purchasers.3
The standard of care imposed upon the wholesaler may not always
be what a jury would determine to be that of the reasonable man.
Where the plaintiff-consumer is able to demonstrate, somewhere in
the wholesaler's handling of the goods which caused his injury, the
violation of a statute which, if obeyed, would have prevented the in-
jury, the problem arises as to the weight such evidence of statutory
violation is to have. Of course, there must be some connection be-
tween the purpose for which the statute was passed and the con-
sumer's injury; in other words, the statute must have been enacted
in order to protect the consumer from the type of injury he incurred.7
It is possible to say that such violation is merely evidence of the
wholesaler's negligence, to be considered along with all the other evi-
dence presented.3 8 In that case, the function of the jury remains two-
fold: to ascertain a standard of care, and to determine whether, in
fact, the wholesaler maintained that standard. On the other hand, a
great number of states have held that violation of statute is negligence
per se, and conclusive as to the standard of care to be applied.3D In
such jurisdictions the jury's function is solely to determine whether,
in fact, the wholesaler maintained the standard of care established by
the statute.
35. In Kentucky Independent Oil Co. v. Schnitzler, 208 Ky. 507, 271 S.W. 570
(1925), where the wholesaler's truck driver unwittingly poured several gallons
of gasoline into a tank of kerosene at the retailer's place of business the driver
warned the retailer not to sell any of the fluid. Instead, the retailer solad a quantity
to the plaintiff consumer, who thought it to be kerosene, and who was injured in an
explosion caused by the fuel. The wholesaler was held liable to the plaintiff in
spite of the warning to the retailer, since the wholesaler should have anticipated
that the retailer would sell some of the fuel without warning the consumer. For
a similar case, see Frazier v. Ayres, 20 So. 2d 754 (La. App. 1945).
36. Gerkin v. Brown & Sehler Co., 177 Mich. 45, 143 N.W. 48 (1913).
37. PROSSER, TORTS § 34 (2d ed. 1955).
38. Howson v. Foster Beef Co., 87 N.H. 200, 177 Atl. 656 (1935).
39. Howson v. Derby Foods, Inc., 110 F.2d 970 (2d Cir. 1940) ; Hoskins v. Jack-
s6n Grain Co., 63 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 1953); Kearse v. Seyb, 200 Mo. App. 645, 209
S.W. 635 (1919); Darks v. Scudders-Gale Grocer Co., 146 Mo. Anp. 246. 130 S.W.
430 (1910) ; Nelson v. West Coast Dairy Co., 5 Wash. 2d 284, 105 P.2d 76 (1940).
In Wellington v. Downer Kerosene Oil Co., 104 Mass. 64 (1870), the statute
stipulated civil liability for its violation.
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Where violation of statute is held to be negligence per se, the effect
is to impose strict liability upon the wholesaler. Thus, the wholesaler
may be liable to the consumer not only when he has committed no
negligent act himself, but also when he could not have acquired knowl-
edge of the deleterious nature of the goods through any feasible pro-
cedure. Such a statute may not be satisfied by taking what appear to
be reasonable precautions; its command is absolute, i.e.: Sell no un-
wholesome food.40 When confronted by such a statute, no matter how
great a measure of precaution the wholesaler takes, if he is found to
have sold food which is unwholesome, he will be held liable to any con-
sumer injured thereby.
Pure food and drug acts are the primary statutes confronting the
wholesaler under which he may be held to absolute liability.41 In such
a case, decided upon the basis of Ohio law, a wholesaler of canned meat
was held liable to an injured consumer under the pure food statute,
although it was clear that no act of the wholesaler's had caused the
defect in the goods, and, in fact, it would have been impossible for the
wholesaler to have discovered the defect without opening the can,
thereby making the goods unsalable.4 2 Likewise, statutes governing
the volatility of liquid fuels are applied so as to impose absolute liabil-
ity.4 3 Occasionally, wholesalers have been held to an absolute degree
of liability in regard to miscellaneous statutes, such as those regulat-
ing the sale of seeds. 44
40. The typical food and drug statute incorporates equivalent language. For
example, MO. REV. STAT. § 196.015 (1949), provides:
The following acts and the causing thereof within the state of Missouri
are hereby prohibited:(1) The manufacture, sale, or delivery, holding, or offering for sale of any
food, drug, device, or cosmetic that is adulterated or misbranded ...
41. Hunter v. Derby Foods, Inc., 110 F.2d 970 (2d Cir. 1940); Darks v. Scud-
ders-Gale Grocer Co. 146 Mo. App. 246, 130 S.W. 430 (1910); Nelson v. West
Coast Dairy Co., 5 Wash. 2d 284, 105 P.2d 76 (1940).
42. Hunter v. Derby Foods, Inc., 110 F.2d 970 (2d Cir. 1940).
43. Kearse v. Seyb, 200 Mo. App. 645, 209 S.W. 635 (1919); Wellington v.
Downer Kerosene Oil Co., 104 Mass. 64 (1870). Kearse v. Seyb is an excellent
illustration of just how strict it is possible for strict liability to be. In that case,
a Missouri statute placed a duty upon all fuel dealers to insnect the fuel sold.
The defendant, a wholesale fuel dealer, ordered a carload of kerosene from the
refinery; due to some confusion between the refiner and the railroad carrier, a
carload of gasoline mixed with kerosene was sent under a bill of lading which
declared the contents to be kerosene. Upon receipt of the order bill of ladng,
the defendant fuel dealer immediately negotiated it to another fuel dealer. The
defendant did not handle the carload which had originally been consigned to him,
as it was delivered directly to the other dealer pursuant to the negotiation of the
bill of lading. Nevertheless, when an ultimate consumer was injured when the
highly volatile fuel exploded, recovery was allowed against the defendant fuel
dealer on the basis that, being a dealer who sold the fuel, he was under an abso-
lute statutory duty to make an inspection.
44. In Hosriins v. Jackson Grain Co., 63 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 1953). a seed whole-
saler was held liable under a statute for selling incorrectly labeled tomato seeds,
in spite of the fact that his function in the distributive chain was only to handle
bags of seed already labeled by a previous vendor. Upon a retrial of the case,
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2. Wholesaler's Liability for the Manufacturer's Negligence
Where a wholesaler sells goods in such a manner as to make it ap-
pear that he is the manufacturer, he may be found liable to the con-
sumer not only for his own negligence, but also for that of the manu-
facturer, which the wholesaler is said to assume. The wholesaler's
representation to the effect that the goods are his own product raises
a vicarious liability for the acts of the manufacturer. This vicarious
liability arises most commonly where the wholesaler labels and sells,
under his own private brand-name, goods produced for him by a man-
ufacturer. Of course, where the wholesaler does nothing more than
handle the goods, and in no way identifies himself as the manu-
facturer, he will not be held to have assumed liability for the manu-
facturer's negligence." While food cases make up the bulk of the
litigation in this area, liability extends to all products potentially
harmful, including paints and cigars.
Before 1930, there were only a few cases involving actions against
the wholesaler which even remotely considered the problem of placing
the manufacturer's liability upon the wholesaler when the latter rep-
resented the goods to be his own product.4 In 1930, Section 400 of the
Restatement of Torts was promulgated, perhaps being as much de-
pendent upon a notion of what the law ought to be as upon what the
law actually was at that time:
One who puts out as his own product a chattel manufactured by
another is subject to the same liability as though he were its
manufacturer.
the ultimate purchaser, a farmer, won a verdict of over $50,000, but this was
reversed because the jurors had employed an improper means to determine the
amount of the award. Jackson Grain Co. v. Hoskins, 75 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 1954).
45. Elmore v. Grenada Grocery Co., 189 Miss. 370, 197 So. 761 (1940); Cor-
nelius v. B. Filippone & Co., 119 N.J.L. 540, 197 At. 647 (Sup. Ct. 1938) ; Singer
v. Zabelin, 24 N.Y.S.2d 962 (N.Y. City Ct. 1941).
46. Two cases involving wholesalers clearly anticipated the Restatement rule.
Thornhill v. Carpenter-Morton Co., 220 Mass. 593, 108 N.E. 474 (1915); Darks v.
Scudders-Gale Grocer Co., 146 Mo. App. 246, 130 S.W. 430 (1910). On the other
hand, one case seems clearly to have taken the contrary view. Fleetwood v. Swift
& Co., 27 Ga. App. 502, 108 S.E. 909 (1921).
47. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 400 (1934). Burkhardt v. Armour & Co., 115 Conn.
249, 161 Atl. 385 (1932), cited below as adhering to the Restatement rule, was
decided under § 270 of the Restatement's Tentative Draft #5, which appeared in
1930.
Ostensibly, at least, under § 400 the wholesaler is being held vicariously liable
for the negligence of the manufacturer. In practice, however, this amounts almost
to strict liability. As DicKERSoN, op. cit. supra note 8, § 2.23 observes,
Theoretically, putting the wholesaler in the shoes of the manufacturer has
no legal consequences unless the manufacturer himself is shown to be re-
sponsible. In warranty cases causation is a problem, and in negligence cases
the plaintiff also has the burden of showing culpability. Where the manu-
facturer is in Argentina the task of establishing this responsibility might
seem formidable. Practically, it has not been so. An Ohio plaintiff by-passed
the Argentina problem altogether by showing the wholesaler's own "negli-
gence" from a violation of the pure food law. [Hunter v. Derby Foods, Inc.,
110 F.2d 970 (2d Cir. 1940).] Two cases inferred the manufacturer's negli-
gence from the fact of causation. [Armour & Co. v. Leasure, 177 Md. 393, 9
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Beginning in 1932, the courts have given wide recognition to the rule
of the Restatement.4 The only dispute has arisen not in regard to the
validity of the rule, but as to whether it should be applied to various
factual situations.
The situation most clearly falling within Section 400 is one where
no indication is given that the wholesaler could be anything but the
manufacturer of the goods. Thus, for example, where the label on
goods simply sets out the wholesaler's name without words to qualify
his capacity, and the manufacturer's name is absent, the case is
squarely within the plain meaning of Section 400, since the consumer
will reasonably infer that the name on the goods is that of the manu-
facturer.-
When qualifying words appear on the label, however, such as
"packed for" or "distributor," or when the name of the manufacturer
is set out in small letters on a label which is clearly that of the whole-
saler, the question naturally arises whether such cases fall under Sec-
tion 400, or whether the qualification makes it clear that the whole-
saler is not putting the goods "out as his own product."' 0
In a Missouri case involving deleterious canned salmon labeled as
"packed for" the wholesaler, without the manufacturer's name ap-
pearing on the label, it was held that the qualifying words negatived
the idea that the wholesaler could be the manufacturer, and therefore
the wholesaler would not be burdened with the manufacturer's liabil-
ity.51 Likewise, in a Massachusetts case, the fact that the wholesaler
was identified as "distributor" on a catsup label and the lack of evi-
dence sufficient to show a connection between the wholesaler and the
brand name on the label were held to be enough to relieve the whole-
saler from the manufacturer's liability.-2 The latter case is not an
unequivocal holding that the use of the qualifying word "distributor"
A.2d 572 (1940); Swift & Co. v. Blackwell, 84 F.2d 130 (4th Cir. 1936).]
Three others simply ignored the problem. [Burkhardt v. Armour & Co., 115
Conn. 249, 161 Atl. 385 (1932); Swift & Co. v. Hawkins, 174 Miss. 253,
164 So. 231 (1935); Slavin v. Francis H. Leggett & Co., 114 N.J.L. 421, 177
At. 120 (1935), ajf'd, 117 N.J.L. 101, 186 AtI. 832 (1936).] In net result
the difference between negligence and breach of warranty is, once more,
hardly discernible.
48. Whether the adoption of § 400 by the framers of the Restatement
actually caused the sudden increase in the number of cases in this area after
1932 is problematical. It would seem, however, that the cases would have arisen
anyway, due to the creation of a nation-wide market for "name-brand" products,
and that the timely appearance of the Restatement provided the courts with a
well-reasoned rule.
49. Thornhill v. Carpenter-Morton Co., 220 Mass. 593, 108 N.E. 474 (1915);
Gittelson v. Gotham Pressed Steel Corp., 266 App. Div. 866, 42 N.Y.S.2d 341(2d Dep't 1943); Dow Drug Co. v. Nieman, 57 Ohio App. 190, 13 N.E.2d 130
(1936).
50. As can be gathered from the text supported by notes 51-54 infra, "distrib-
utor" is neither a stronger nor a weaker qualification than "packed for."
51. De Gouveia v. H.D. Lee Mercantile Co., 231 Mo. App. 447, 100 S.W.2d
336 (1936).
52. Hamson v. Standard Grocery Co., 328 Mass. 263, 103 N.E.2d 233 (1952).
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will relieve the wholesaler, however, as the court indicated that had
stronger evidence been presented linking the brand name with the
wholesaler, a wholly different result might have ensued.
On the other hand, the majority of courts have not allowed such
qualifications as "distributor" or "packed for" to relieve the whole-
saler from the manufacturer's liability.5 3 Especially has this been so
where an action could not be maintained successfully against the re-
tailer or the manufacturer, and to exonerate the wholesaler from this
added liability would be to deny all recovery to the injured consumer."
So, where the label on a can of deleterious corned beef named the
wholesaler as "distributor," and also bore the name of the Brazilian
packing company, the court did not hesitate in imposing the manu.
facturer's liability upon the wholesaler. 5
B. Liability in Contract for Breach of Warranty
Sales warranties are of two kinds, express and implied. An express
warranty, under the sales act, is a promise or an affirmation of fact
made by the seller which relates to the nature of the goods, upon which
the buyer reasonably relies6 As it is generally held that express
warranties do not run with the goods, but are effective only as be-
tween the parties to the transaction in the course of which the war-
ranty was made, it is clear that the consumer, having had no direct
dealings with the wholesaler, has virtually no chance of recovery in an
action against the wholesaler based upon what is alleged to be an
express warranty.57
An implied warranty, on the other hand, is an obligation which the
53. Swift & Co. v. Blackwell, 84 F.2d 130 (4th Cir. 1936) ("distributor");
Burkhardt v. Armour & Co., 115 Conn. 249, 161 Atl. 385 (1932) ("distributor");
Armour & Co. v. Leasure, 177 Md. 393, 9 A.2d 572 (1939) ("packed for"); Swift
.& Co. v. Hawkins, 174 Miss. 253, 164 So. 231 (1935) ("distributor"); Slavin v.
Francis H. Leggett & Co., 114 N.J.L. 421, 177 Atl. 120 (Sup. Ct. 1915), aff'd,
117 N.J.L. 101, 186 AtI. 832 (Ct. Err. & App. 1936) ("distributor"). In Fleetwood
v. Swift & Co., 27 Ga. App. 502, 108 S.E. 909 (1921), decided before the publica-
tion of the Restatement of Torts, it was held that the word "distributor" on the
label was sufficient, in the absence of any evidence showing the brand name to be
that of the defendant, to relieve the wholesaler from liability for the mnanu-
facturer's negligence.
54. Thus, in Burkhardt v. Armour & Co., 115 Conn. 249, 161 Atl. 385 (1932),
the manufacturer was in Argentina; in Armour & Co. v. Leasure, 177 Md. 393,
9 A.2d 572 (1939), the manufacturer was in Brazil.
55. Armour & Co. v. Leasure, 177 Md. 393, 9 A.2d 572 (1939).
56. UNiFORm SALES ACT § 12.
57. Recently, there seems to be growing acceptance on the part of the courts
that, under certain circumstances, an express warranty may be assignable. and
therefore may in effect run with the goods. See, e.g.. Jeffery v. Hanson, 39 Wash.
2d 855, 239 P.2d 346 (1952). Other cases involve the assignment of an express
warranty unon the negotiation of a bill of lading. Hunter-Wilson Distilling Co.
v. Foust Distilling Co., 181 F.2d 543 (3d Cir. 1950); Esbeco Distilling Corp. v.
Owings Mills Distillery, Inc., 43 F. Supn 380 (D. Md. 1942). In Cochran v.
McDonald, 23 Wash. 2d 348, 161 P.2d 305 (1945), the wholesaler apparently
could have -donted the manufacturer's express warranty, but did not. See 1
WILLSTON, SALES § 244 (3d ed. 1948).
Washington University Open Scholarship
NOTES
law places upon the seller of goods,58 and is not dependent upon any
representation by the seller. Implied warranties are of two kinds,
warranties of title59 and warranties of quality ;6o the consumer injured
by a defect in the quality of the goods will naturally bring his contract
action for breach of implied warranty of quality.
Since warranty liability is strict, and fault need not be proved in
order to recover,61 an action for breach of implied warranty of quality
is a more attractive means of recovery to the injured consumer than
is a negligence action. Establishing the existence of such an implied
warranty upon which to base an action, however, provides great diffi-
culty in actions brought against wholesalers and manufacturers with
whom there has been no contractual dealing, for the sales warranty
is recognized as a creature of contract.62 Although in tort actions the
requirement of privity of contract between the supplier and the in-
jured consumer has been abandoned, 3 in actions for breach of a sales
warranty privity is still a requirement in virtually all jurisdictions,
with very few exceptions. The traditional expression has been that
implied warranties, as well as express warranties, do not run with the
goods to sub-vendees; hence, no privity of contract, no warranty. 4
In a small but growing number of states the privity requirement
has been either discarded or avoided in implied warranty actions by
injured consumers against food manufacturers.65 In actions by con-
sumers against the manufacturers of goods other than food, however,
the privity requirement has not been relaxed." This development has
been extended to food manufacturers in order to protect the great
public interest in this area; there is little indication that in actions
against the manufacturers of other goods the privity requirement is
on the verge of repudiation.
In regard to actions by consumers against food wholesalers for
58. VOLD, SALES 440 (1931).
59. UNIFORM SALES ACT § 13.
60. UNIFORM SALES AcT § 15.
61. 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 237 (3d ed. 1948).
62. 4 SHEARmAN & REDFIELD, NEGLIGENCE § 893 (rev. ed. 1941).
63. See text supported by notes 18-21 supra.
64. Farlow v. Jeffcoat, 78 Ga. App. 653, 52 S.E.2d 30 (1949) (implied war-
ranty of title).
65. DICKERSON, op. cit. supra note 8, § 2.2; MEcCx, THE SALE OF FOOD AND
DRINK c. 9 (1936).
66. That the relaxation of the privity of contract requirement is generally
limited to food cases is apparent from the fact that states which have extended
warranty liability to manufacturers of food have refused to follow this extension
in cases dealing with other products. See, e.g., Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co.,
42 Cal. 2d 682, 268 P.2d 1041 (1954) (insecticide); Paull v. McBride, 273 Mich.
661, 263 N.W. 877 (1935) (kerosene); Cochran v. McDonald, 23 Wash. 2d 348,
161 P.2d 305 (1945) (anti-freeze). See text supported by note 79 infra for a
discussion of the effect of the Uniform Commercial Code upon warranty liability
of manufacturers and wholesalers. See also Spruill, Privity of Contract as a
Requisite for Recovery on Warranty, 19 N.C.L. REv. 551 (1941). In McAfee v.
Cargill, Inc., 121 F. Supp. 5 (S.D. Cal. 1954), the relaxation of privity was
significantly advanced from human food cases to dog food cases.
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breach of implied warranty of quality, on the other hand, only in
Kansas has the privity requirement expressly been discarded.07 It
cannot be clearly determined from the relatively small number of re-
ported cases whether in setting aside the privity requirement the
courts have made any distinction between wholesalers and manu-
facturers, by requiring privity in actions by consumers against the
one and discarding it in similar actions against the other s8 Thus, it
may be that in many of those states where actions for breach of im-
plied warranty by consumers against food manufacturers have been
allowed by disregarding the privity requirement, actions by con-
sumers against food wholesalers would be permitted on the same
basis.
In Kansas, a series of three cases, beginning in 1933, has placed
liability for breach of implied warranty of quality first upon the food
wholesaler, and subsequently upon the wholesaler of cosmetics. The
earliest case, Challis v. Hartloiff,9 dealt with an action for breach of
implied warranty against a retailer and a "broker" for personal in-
juries occasioned by the presence of arsenic in flour sold to a con-
sumer. The "broker" appeared to be a wholesaler who purchased the
flour from a miller and sold it to the retailer. The court found that the
"broker" could be found liable for violation of the implied warranty,
because when he had sold the flour to the retailer he had intended that
it be for the purpose of resale, and he had fully known the effects that
deleterious flour might have on consumers' health. Therefore, upon a
theory roughly analogous to that of the third-party beneficiary, the
implied warranty of the "broker" extended beyond the retailer to the
ultimate consumer.
The second Kansas case, Swengel v. F. & E. Wholesale Grocery
Co.,7 0 was decided in 1938, and dealt with a can of unwholesome sauer-
kraut juice which the defendant wholesaler had merely handled in the
course of distribution; the can had been labeled by, and bore the
brand name of, the packer. Holding that there had been a breach of
an implied warranty of quality, the court gave judgment for the
plaintiff against the defendant wholesaler. In reaching this conclu-
sion, the Kansas court leaped two legal hurdles with apparent ease:
first, there was no privity of contract between the parties; second, the
product was in a sealed can, impervious to the defendant's inspection
efforts.7 1 In other jurisdictions, either of these standing alone has
67. See text supported by notes 69-73 infra.
68. See, e.g., note 9 supra, for the current status of Missouri law.
69. 136 Kan. 823, 18 P.2d 199 (1933).
70. 147 Kan. 555, 77 P.2d 930 (1938).
71. See note 76 infra.
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been sufficient to relieve the wholesaler from liability.7- The court re-
lied heavily upon Challis v. Hartloff; it also stressed the possible
difficulty of obtaining jurisdiction over the manufacturer, who might
be a non-resident, and the possibility of the retailer's insolvency,
which, in the court's view of the public interest, justified the result.
The 1954 Kansas decision of Graham v. Bottenfield's, Inc.73 went
considerably beyond both prior Kansas cases, as it allowed recovery
against the distributor of a hair preparation for injury to the con-
sumer where there was no privity. The reasoning of the case par-
allels that of the Swengel decision; however, the fact that not food but
a hair preparation was involved represents a considerable extension
of the doctrine rejecting the privity requirement. In fact, the Graham
case has dropped the privity requirement in actions against whole-
salers in an area in which it still stands in actions against manufac-
turers.
Texas, one of the first states to discard the privity requirement in
warranty actions by consumers against food manufacturers,74 has not
yet committed itself as to food wholesalers' liability for breach of im-
plied warranty to the consumer, although the question arose in the
1952 case of Bowman Biscuit Co. v. Hines,75 where the plaintiff was in-
jured by a wire in a cookie. The consumer's action against the whole-
saler was dismissed, not for lack of privity of contract, but because the
court concluded that the wholesaler should not be held liable under
the "sealed container" doctrine, the manufacturer having packaged
the cookies in a sealed container.76 Where the goods were in a sealed
package, said the court, both the wholesaler and the retailer should
be immune to a negligence or breach of implied warranty action based
upon a defect in the goods which they could not have discovered by
inspection. That the court did not dismiss the action against the
wholesaler for lack of privity, however, is an indication that it does
72. See notes 75, 78 infra.
73. 176 Kan. 68, 269 P.2d 413 (1954).
74. Jacob E. Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 144 S.W.2d 404 (Tex. Civ. App.
1940).
75. 151 Tex. 370, 251 S.W.2d 153 (1952), 1953 WASH. U.L.Q. 327.
76. The "sealed container" doctrine is said to be an exception to the rule
which imposes an implied warranty of quality upon the retailers and wholesalers
of food. The development of this doctrine in recent years represents what appears
to be the only turning away by the courts from the trend toward the imposition
of strict liability upon suppliers of goods. It must be pointed out, however, that
to date only a minority of states have adopted the sealed container doctrine.
DICKERSON, op. cit. supra note 8, § 1.15.
Insofar as wholesalers are concerned, only in those states which have abolished
the privity requirement in breach of contract actions has the sealed container
doctrine been considered. In Kansas, the doctrine was considered and rejected.Swengel v. F. & E. Wholesale Grocery Co., 147 Kan. 555, 77 P.2d 930 (1938).
In Texas, where "public policy" has done away with the privity requirement the
sealed container doctrine was adopted by a divided court. Bowman Biscuit do. v.
Hines, 151 Tex. 370, 251 S.W.2d 153 (1952), 1953 WASH. IJ.L.Q. 327.
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not consider lack of privity a bar to implied warranty actions against
food wholesalersY.7
In other jurisdictions where actions for breach of implied warranty
of quality have been brought by the consumer against the wholesaler,
whether of food or of other goods, the lack of privity of contract be-
tween the parties has put the plaintiff out of court.7 8
As mentioned above, there is little indication that the wholesaler's
liability for breach of implied warranty will be universally expanded
in the near future through the complete abolition of the privity of
contract requirement. It was hoped that the new Uniform Commercial
Code would provide a sweeping solution to the privity problem; in-
stead, the liability of the wholesaler and the manufacturer can be ex-
tended under the new code only by judicial legislation, for the code
is strictly neutral as to the warranty liability of wholesalers and man-
ufacturers to the ultimate consumer.70
In order to escape the strict and often harsh privity requirement,
novel approaches have sometimes been suggested, such as making the
consumer a third-party beneficiary of the contract between whole-
saler and retailer, 0 or imposing a fictitious agency upon the sale by
the retailer to the consumer, so as to make the wholesaler the retailer's
principal, and therefore a party to the contract of sale.,1 If the privity
requirement is to be set aside, however, a more frank approach to
the problem is to be preferred. Such an approach is to be found where
the privity requirement has not been deviously avoided, but squarely
faced and expressly rejected.
In summation, in the vast majority of jurisdictions the lack of
privity of contract stands as a bar to breach of warranty actions by
injured consumers against wholesalers. Only in Kansas, where both
food wholesalers and cosmetic wholesalers have been found liable for
breach of warranty, has the privity requirement been relaxed so as
to allow recovery by the consumer.
77. Apparently the Texas court had decided to affirm the judgment against
the wholesaler on the basis of the Decker case, note 74 supra, when the sealed
container argument won a majority of the court to the view that the wholesaler
is not liable. See 151 Tex. 370, 251 S.W.2d 153 (1952).
78. De Gouveia v. H.D. Lee Mercantile Co., 231 Mo. App. 447, 100 S.W.2d
336 (1936); Howson v. Foster Beef Co., 87 N.H. 200. 177 Atl. 656 (1915): Cor-
nelius v. B. FiliDpone & Co., 119 N.J.L. 540, 197 Atl. 647 (Sup. Ct. 1938); Singer
v. Zabelin, 24 N.Y.S.2d 962 (N.Y. City Ct. 1941); Dobbin v. Pacific Coast Coal
Co., 25 Wash. 2d 190, 170 P.2d 642 (1946); Cochran v. McDonald, 23 Wash. 2d
348, 161 P.2d 305 (1945).
79. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-318 has extended the warranty liability
of the vendor to the immediate family and guests of the vendee, but has not
made any vertical extension of liability in the distributive chain.
80. Amalgamated Packaging Industries, Ltd. v. National Contniner CorD.,
14 F.R.D. 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); Jeffery v. Hanson, 39 Wash. 2d 855, 239 P.2d
346 (1952).
81. Green v. Equitable Powder Mfg. Co., 95 F. Supp. 127 (W.D. Ark. 1951);
Jordan v. Worthington Pump & Mach. Co., 73 Ariz. 329, 241 P.2d 433 (1952).
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Conclusion
In summation, we have seen that when injured consumers have
chosen to seek recovery from the wholesalers of the goods which caused
their injury they have customarily brought actions for negligence or
for breach of implied warranty of quality. Occasionally, the adoption
of relatively novel theories of agency or third-party beneficiary has
been urged by consumers in actions against wholesalers, but these ac-
tions have rarely been successful.
Negligence actions against wholesalers have been most successful
in areas where the consumer has not had to prove an element of cul-
pability in the wholesaler in order to recover, viz., where statutory
violation is negligence per se, or where the wholesaler may be vicari-
ously liable for the manufacturer's negligence. Where some degree
of fault must be shown in the wholesaler, recovery is naturally more
difficult, since the wholesaler's function is usually only to handle the
goods, thus making it harder for the consumer to demonstrate acts
of the wholesaler which have caused the goods to be deleterious.
Actions by consumers against wholesalers for breach of implied
warranty of quality have been successful in only one state; in other
states, the lack of contractual privity has been held to be a bar to
breach of warranty actions by consumers against wholesalers.
From an examination of the judicial trend of the past forty years,
insofar as actions against suppliers of goods have been increasingly
based upon a strict liability basis, it would seem that eventually all
suppliers of goods may find themselves held strictly liable to consum-
ers. This development may come through a relaxation of the privity
of contract requirement in breach of warranty actions, or by an ex-
tensive increase in the number and scope of statutes designed to pro-
tect consumers. This evolution will probably be completed first with
food and drugs; strict liability as to other products will lag more or
less behind, depending upon the degree of potential harm to the gen-
eral public inherent in each.
There is no clear moral issue in the question whether wholesalers
should be made absolutely liable to consumers for defects in the goods
sold. The individual's interest in being held liable only when at fault
may be overridden by the public interest in compensating individuals
injured by defects in goods which, if perfectly produced, would be
wholesome and harmless.
In the final analysis, the issue may be an economic one: where shall
the loss ultimately fall? Occasionally, goods which are normally whole-
some turn out to be deleterious, to the hurt of some consumer. Should
he bear the cost of this injury alone, or should the rest of the con-
suming public contribute financially to him, in order to render him
whole? By imposing liability at levels where the cost may be spread to
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the many, a form of social insurance is provided which, in the final
accounting, puts upon society as a whole the burden for society's in-
ability to produce non-harmful merchandise, not simply most of the
time, but all of the time.
Viewed in this light, it cannot be said to be an unjust imposition to
make the wholesaler absolutely liable to the consumer for the quality
of the goods sold. The current position of the courts denying such ab-
solute liability much of the time will not be changed overnight; the
gradualness of change within the judicial processes is not unknown.
But that the courts will ultimately arrive at such a position seems as-,
sured. T. LAUEm
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